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THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW: 
1969-1970 
PRACTICE AND PLEADING 
W. Taylor Reveley Ill* 
Mter quicldy: · outlining . recent _legislation in the field of practice and 
pleading, this Article proceeds to' a more detailed treatment of pertinent 
judicial developments. Several o£ the Supreme Court of Appeals' deciSions 
merit close attention, principally,Rak~s v. F7Jlcher1 and Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting· Park, lnc.2 Recurrent in the discussion of the judicial opinions 
is concern not only with the announced law, but also with the manner Of 
the announcement-concern, that is, with both the legal results and the legal 
craftsmanship. Organizationally, an attempt has been made to discuss the 
judicial material at the time of its "moment of truth" in the procedural 
process; for example, the problem of "an issue first raised on appeal" will 
be treated under the consideration of trial errors, since the failure to raise 
an issue during trial generally precludes success on appeal, so far as that 
issue is concerned. 
THE WoRK oF THE GENERAL AssEMBLY 
Among the more important 1969-1970 legislative developments was enact-
ment of a provision empowering courts of record and courts not of record 
to "prescribe such rules as may be reasonably appropriate to promote proper 
order and decorum, the convenient and efficient use of courthouses and 
clerks' offices and the orderly management of court dockets." 3 This pro-
vision is limited in that any rules adopted are to be applicable only to the 
courts prescribing them and are not to be "inconsistent with or in addition 
to any statutory provision, or the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals, 
or contrary to the decided cases." 4 In addition, such rules may not have 
"the effect of abridging substantive rights of persons before such court." 6 
• Member, Virginia Bar. A.B., 1965, Princeton University; LL.B., 1968, University of 
Virginia. 
1210 Va. 542,172 S.E.2d 751 (1970). See text at notes 64-101 infra. 
2Appeal refused, 208 Va. cxiii (1967), vacated & remanded, 392 U.S. 657, reordered, 
209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See text at notes 119-134 
infra. 
3 VA. ConE ANN. § 8-1.3 (Supp. 1970), repealing id. § 16.1-25 (1957), which stated: 
"The judge of a court not of record may make and enforce such reasonable rules of 
practice for his court, as are not in conflict with law." 
4[d. § 8-1.3 (Supp.1970). 
5[d. j., • 
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Regarding service of process and notice, the General Assembly eliminated 
the requirement that the return on out-of-Virginia personal .service state 
that "the defendant so served is a nonresident of this State." 6 The legisla-
tors also provided that, when process is served on the Commissioner of the 
Division of Motor Vehicles as the agent of a nonresident defendant involved 
in a Virginia traffic accident, notice to the defendant may be mailed (a) to 
the last address given by him on his license application if he was licensed 
by Virginia, assuming no other address is known, or (b) to the address 
given on the accident report if he was not so licensed.7 In this regard, the 
Virginia licensee is deemed "to have accepted as valid service" the mailing 
of process to the address he last reported to the Division. Even more im-
portant, the non-Virginia licensee is deemed to have waived his right to 
notice and to have accepted service upon the Commissioner if he incorrecdy 
reports his address or if he moves from the reported address without pro.-
viding for the forwarding of his mail. 
A judicial power of some importance was made explicit in a Code section 
stating that a mental or physical examination of a party may be ordered 
if the pleadings raise an issue as to his condition and the opposing party so 
moves. This section provides: · 
,, 
Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, in any 
action, if the pleadings raise an issue as to the physical or ,menb,ll con-
dition of a party, the court, upon motion of an adverse party, may 
order the party to submit to an examination by one or more physicians 
or licensed clinical psychologist [sic] named in the order and em-
ployed by the moving party. A written report of the e_xamipation 
shall be made by the physician or physic;:ians or licensed. clinical psy-
chologists to the court and filed with the clerk thereof before the 
trial and a copy furnished to each party. The court may; in the order, 
fix the time an:d place for the examination ·and the. time for· filing the 
report and furnishing the copies.8 · ·· · · 
The General Assembly also notably ·heightened the penalties for fillure 
to respond to a civil summons._ Prior to its·amendment, Code section 8-302 
authorized, among other sanctions, that the miscreant be _fined ~'not exceed-
ing twenty dollars, to the use of the party for·whom he was summoned." 
He may now be assessed up to two hundred dollars for that purpose and 
6 I d. § 8-74. The amendment goes on to provide retroactively that "[a)ny· defendant 
served pursuant to the provisions of this section prior to [January 1, 1970] shall be 
deemed to have been a nonresident of this State even though the return fails to state 
that the defendant so served was a nonresident of this State." 
7 Id. § 8-67.2. See also id. § 8-76 (procedure governing notice by publication in divorce 
or annulment proceedings). . ! · · 
s I d. § 8-210.1. 
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~·m· addicloiti to·- the iniposiclo~- tif ·such assessment, P'iay he punished ~s ·for 
a contern_et_:cGmmitt_ed .in the pre_s~nce of the court." 9 · • . . · . · · • 
· Several· amendments affecting jury: selection were adopted .. Whe:re' pte-
'viously any Woman could notify the jury cornmissidner that she did not 
desire th~t· het ~name be placed on the jury list, she must now have the 
occupation-af housewife before obtaining the privilege. In addition, veter-
inar:J:~ns ru:etnow exempt from jury duty.10 The method of compiling jury 
lists has also· been changed "slightly- so that a city's inhabitants are ·now 
counted With those of the county in 'vhich the city is located if "the circuit 
court of the county also has jurisdiction of cases arising within the teiri-
toriallimit:S of such city : . . . " 11 . · . • 
The General Assembly also sought to ease somewhat the burden of 
counsel at trial by eliminating the necessity that lawyers make fmmal 
exception to· those rulings or orders of courts of record· that they oppose: 
Forma:l exceptions to rulings or orders of the court shall be un-
neces'sary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore 
been necessary, it shall be sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling 
or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the 
action which he desires the court to take or his objections to the 
action of the cqurt and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no 
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the 
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him on motion 
for a new trial or on appeal.12 
!f nothing else, this provision should reduce the number of appeals lost on 
technicaliti~. 
Various changes were made in. judicial costs and fees, the principal: legis-
lation centering on briefs before the Supreme Court of Appeals. Prior to 
·its amendment, Code section 14.1-182 referred to a single brief and pro-
vided that the assessed cost for its printing could not exceed one hundred 
tweno/ doll~s~ The section now states that "[a]ny party in whose favor 
costs are allowed in the Supreme Court of Appeals shall have taxed as part 
of the cost'the actual cost of printing his brief or briefs, if filed by him, not 
to exceed t\vo hundred dollar~." 13 In addition, minor changes were made 
in several fees incident to suit.14' 
--. 9.[d. § S-302. 
10 I d. § 8-178.: 
ll'Jd. § 8-1S2. Also concerned with juries is id: § 8-792 (1957), which provides that 
:r jury may: be empanelled to try a case of unlawful entry or detainer only when the 
case is being tried before :i court of record. · · 
12[d. § 8-225.1. 
18Jd. § 14.1-1S2 (Supp.1970). 
14Jd. § 14.1-72 (fees of sheriffs, sergeants and deputies for trial attendance); id. 
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· Finally an act was passed to prohibit the practice of law in Virginia courts 
by certain retired state judges and commissioners. The measure provides 
that: 
No former justice or judge of a court of record of the Common-
wealth and no former full-time judge of a court not of record of the 
Commonwealth, who is retired and receiving benefits under [the Judi-
cial Retirement System, created by 1970 legislation, §§ 51-160 to 177], 
shall appear as counsel in any case in any court of the Commonwealth. 
No former commissioner of the State Corporation Commission or 
Industrial Commission, who is retired and receiving benefits under 
[the Judicial Retirement System] shall appear as counsel in any case 
before the Commission of which he was formerly a member.15 
This provision serves not only to remove the possibility of actual prejudice 
to parties who might have been opposed by such former judges, but also to 
"avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." 16 
THE WoRK oF THE SuPREME CouRT oF APPEALS 
Bars to Trial 
Election of Remedies 
During the Survey period, parties sought by a variety of gambits to pre-
vent trial. In Jennings v. Realty Developers, Inc.p defendants raised in bar 
an alleged election of remedies. Realty had filed a suit in chancery in June 
1964 for specific performance against Jennings in a property dispute, but 
had taken no further steps to prosecute the action. In February 1967, Realty 
filed a motion for damages arising out of the same dispute. One year there-
after it sought and received a nonsuit on the specific performance claim. 
Defendants then argued that resort to the specific performance suit consti-
tuted an election of remedies and barred the later damage action. The 
Supreme Court of Appeals found no bar, holding that 
the mere institution of a suit in chancery does not necessarily of itself 
constitute an election of remedies and preclude the bringing of an 
action at law; that where two proceedings are instituted on the same 
state of facts, the defendant can compel the plaintiff to make an elec-
S 14.1-112 (those of clerks of courts of record); id. § 14.1-125' (those of judges and 
-clerks of courts not of record and justices of the peace). See also id. §§ 5'8-71, -72 
'(changes in cen:tin writ taxes). 
15 Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, cb. 778. 
16 ABA CoDE OF PRoFESSIONAL RESPoNsmrurr AND CANONS oF JumciAL ETHics, Canon 
'9 (1969). 
17 210 Va. 476,171 S.E.2d 829 (1970). 
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cion; and that there can be only one recovery where the c;ause .of 
action involves the same parties and touches the same subjec::t matter .. _ ; 
In the instant case the trial judge, before permitting Realty ~D~ 
veloper~ to proceed in its law action, required that it make an election . 
. The elec~ion was made and the chancery suit was dismissed,- leaving 
only~ne c_ause of action which was prosecuted to a judgment.18 . · 
The 9ourt ~~ted without further explanation that its holding "refle~ts . . . 
the be5t co_n,sidered :view." 19 
. ·. 
Judgments in:Pr,ior Actions 
. . 
Judgments in prior .actions were raised as bars in two cases. In each the 
Court rever?ed_ the trial judge. Doummar v. Doummar20 involved the validity 
of a lease 'o~ property owned by an incompetent. The defendants filed a 
"Special Plea of Res Adjudicata," contending that the validity ~f _the Jea5e 
"was litigated and determined in the first proceeding, or could have been 
so litigated and getermined, and that the second proceeding is, therefore~ 
barred." 21 In the first proceeding the sale of certain property owned by 
the incompetent had been sought' and granted on the ground that his exist-
ing income was inadequate to support him. The validity of th~ .lease '\Vas 
squarely raised in that proceeding, but apparendy the commissioner in 
chancery and· trial court made no ruling concerning the lease "other tfian 
was riecessa:ry·in finding that th~ income of the incompetent was insufficient 
for 'his· support." 22 The. Court of Appeals concluded that "the :caus·es of 
action involved in the two proceedings are not the same. The· first was a 
statutc>l:~f pro·ceeding· for the sale of certain property of the incompetent: 
~e_'second;' to. have declared void a lease of other property 0'\Vn,ed by t~e 
lF.Jd! at 482, 171 S.E.2d at 834; cf. Sood v. Advanced Computer Techniques. Corp., 
~08~·F. Supp., 239 (E.D. Va. 1969). In Sood, the plaintiff successfully.lt[gue~ that tlw 
defendant h:id waived its right of removal to federal court by filing cross-~aims in the-
Vrrginia trial court where it had been sued by plaintiff. The district court stated that 
under Virginia law the defendant "was not required to file its counterclaim in the 
State. Court, or face the loss of its claim." !d. at 240. Then, as a matter of federal 
procedure, the court held that "[s]ince the filing of a counterclaim was not compulsory 
but optionai; the defendant invoked the jurisdiction of the State Court, _submitted aU 
issues in that case for its determination, and thereby became a plaintiff." !d. at 242. 
19 210 Va. at 483, I'll S.E.2d at 834. The Justices did cite passages from three legal en-
cyclopedias to support their conclusion; one passage states: "[l]n Virgini~, it is· held 
that in that clas.s of cases in which the remedies are not inconsistent but are alternative 
and concurrent, there is no election ••• unless the plaintiff has gained an advllntage, or 
the defendant has suffered a disadvantage." 6 MicmE's }UR. Election of Rernedies § 4 
(1949). . ' . 
20 210 Va.-189, 169 S.E.2d 454 (1969). 
21 !d. at 190, 169 S.E.2d at 455. 
22 !d. at 193, 169 S.E.2d at 457. 
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incompetent, is an equitable proceeding sounding in fraud ... ·": 23 It fol-
lows that plaintiff did not have a claim of res .judicata, but, at most~ a .claim 
of collateral estoppel; and, as the Court stated, where a different ca:use ·of 
action is raised in the second proceeding, the prior judgment bars further 
litigation " 'only as to those matters in issue or points controverted- [in the 
prior proceeding], upon the determination of which the finding or verdict 
was rendered.' " 24 The Court continued: 
It is obvious from the record of the first suit that the court . 
left to another day and another proceeding the determination of .the 
issue of the validity of the lease. The court merely overruled ... ex-
ceptions [to the commissioner's report based on his failure to declare 
the lease a nullity] and confirmed the commissioner's report without 
making any ruling concerning the lease other than was necessaiy in 
finding that the income of the incompetent was insufficient for his 
support.25 
In contrast to Doummar, where the Justices found no estoppel despite 
the presentation of the pertinent issue in a prior proceeding, they did find 
estoppel in Thrasher v. Thrasher,26 where the pertinent issue had not been 
raised. In 1961 a decree was entered in Thrasher approving settlement agree-
ments resolving a dispute over corporate control. These agreements were 
premised on the existence of a voting trust, but the validity of that trust was 
not raised or passed on in the 1961 action. The Court nonetheless held th~t 
the decree barred a subsequent suit to have the voting agreement voided as 
invalid. The seeming inconsistency between Doummar and Thrasher is ex-
plained by the Court's concern in the latter more with a belief that the party 
challenging the voting trust was attempting " 'to play fast and loose with 
courts' " than with the rules of estoppel.27 The Justices stated that the 
evidence "clearly shows that [the party], in signing the settlement agree-
ments approved by the decree of .•. 1961, held himself out to be acting 
under a valid voting trust. . . • Having signed the 1961 settlement agree-
ments based upon a valid voting trust, and having had his attorney ask the 
court to enter the decree approving these agreements, [that party] will 
not now be permitted to reverse his position by denying the validity of 
23Jd. at 192, 169 S.E.2d at 456. 
24Jd. at 191, 169 S.E.2d at 456; see Boyd, Practice and Pleading, 1966-1967 Annual 
Survey of Virginia Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 1779, 1796-97 (1967). 
25 210 Va. at 193, 169 S.E.2d at 457. 
26 210 Va. 624, 172 S.E.2d 771 (1970). 
_ 27Jd. at 628, 172 S.E.2d at 774, quoting Rohanna v. Vazzana, 196 Va. 549, 553, 84 
'S.E.2d 440, 441 (1954): "'A rule denying litigants the right to play fast and loose 
with courts should be maintained. • • • The rule as here employed may not be strictly 
.regarded as one of estoppel but rather in the nature of a poSitive rule of procedure ••• .' " 
1506 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 56;1500 
the voting trust agreement." 28 The Court also noted that " [ w] e have had 
recent occasion to reaffirm the principle that a party cannot assume positionS. 
which are inconsistent with each other and mutually contradictory." 29 • 
In an analogous decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
DistriCt of Columbia Circuit held in a master-servant case that' a· plaintiff's 
defeat in a Virginia action against an employer for the alleged negligenc~ 
of his employee precluded the plaintiff's subsequent suit in a District of 
Columbia court against the servant. The second action was based on the 
same claim of negligence and for the same injuries,30 and the servant had 
not been a party to the prior Virginia action. Commenting on Virginia law, 
the federal court noted the Commonwealth's "consistent allegiance i:o the 
principle that res judicata bears only on parties to the judgment .... " 31 Yet, 
the court continued: 
We discern in the Virginia cases, not a devotion to the principle of 
mutuality as an unbending dogma, but a recognition that the appro-
priateness of its application hangs on the relative strength of the policy 
considerations in competition. ' 
Much more important-and in our view decisive-are the_ Virginia 
decisions disseminating the policy that one adverse litigative adventure 
on any one issue is enough for any one litigant.32 • 
Thus, the court felt that the prior judgment for the master would 'preclude 
relitigation of the negligence issue in an action against the seryant in :). 
Vrrginia court.aa 
Prior Settlements 
In two cases, prior settlements were presented as barriers to trial. Tl;e 
Virginia Court of Appeals in Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co.34 found the settlement _conclusive. The parties .had settled un-
insured motorist claims, and judgments by agreement had been entered and 
satisfied. Eighteen months later the plaintiffs sought to have .these judg: 
ments set aside, primarily because an intervening ruling by the Court had 
made relief available from additional insurance carriers. The Court found 
' . 
28 210 Va. at 627, 628, 172 S.E.2d at 773, 774. 
29 Id. at 628, 172 S.E.2d at 773, citing McLaughlin v. Gholson, 210 Va. 498, 171 S.E.2d 
816 (1970), discussed in text at notes 56-58 infra. · · · 
30Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.1969). 
31 I d. at 718. 
32 !d. at 719. 
33 Though there appears to be no Virginia precedent squarely on point, the· court 
of appeals seems correct. Cf. Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 S:E.2d 751. 757 
(1970). 
·34 210Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264 (1969). 
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that no more than a possible mistake of law was at stake, and thus that "the 
extraordinary circumstances which would entitle the appellants to relief" 
were lacking.35 
The Court made clear in Nationwide Mutua/Insurance Co. v. Martin/a 
however, that a settlement cannot be used to prevent a party from intro-
ducing evidence in court in an attempt to vitiate the agreement. The 
Nationwide parties were engaged in a lawsuit when they agreed to com-
promise their dispute. The day after the agreement was reached, and before 
their suit had been dismissed, Nationwide obtained evidence that allegedly 
indicated that it had been the victim of fraud. The trial court confirmed 
the settlement nonetheless, without giving Nationwide an opportunity to 
present its evidence. The Court, observing that " 'Nationwide seeks only 
the opportunity to be heard,' " 37 ordered that the opportunity be granted. 
The case of after-discovered evidence was distinguished: Where there has 
"never been a trial, the introduction of any evidence, or the return of a 
verdict," a party seeking to rescind a settlement need not set forth in affi-
davits facts showing what efforts he made to obtain the facts prior to settle-
ment and why he failed to get them.38 The Court premised Nationwide's 
opportunity to be heard on the "well established" principle that" '[a]djust-
ments or settlements may be rescinded or avoided for fraud.' " 39 
Failure to Prosecute 
A seldom raised plea-in-bar was presented the Court by the defendants' 
argument)n Jennings v. Realty Developers, lnc.40 that Realty had lost its 
cause of action by failing to prosecute its specific performance suit promptly 
after the suit's commencement. As indicated previously, there was a delay 
of more than three and one-half years between the initiation of the specific 
performance proceeding and, on the same day, its dismissal and the trial 
35 I d. at 402, 171 S.E.2d at 268. The Court stated that "every fact necessary to be 
known to form a correct conclusion as to the question of law to be decided was known 
to both the appellants and to the representatives of the insurance companies." Jd. at 400, 
171 S.E.fd at 26~. These facts were also known to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, and it reached an incorrect conclusion as to the pertinent ques-
tion of law. The Piedmont parties relied heavily on that federal conclusion in determining 
their own: conduct. See text at note 141 infra. 
36 210 Va. 354, 171 S.E.2d 239 (1969). 
37 I d. at 359, 171 S.E.2d at 242. 
as I d. at 358, 171 S.E.2d at 242. The Court dealt recently with the question of_ after-
discovered evidence in Fulcher v. Whitlow, 208 Va. 34, 155 S.E.2d 362 (1967), discussed 
in Boyd, supra note 24, at 1803-05. The trial court in the present case stressed Nation-
Wide's failure to take advantage of its opportunity to obtain the evidence of fraud 
before agreeing to the settlemertt. See 210 Va. at 356-57, 171 S.E.2d at 240-41. 
3{) ]d.· at 357, 171 S.E.2d at 242, · 
40 210 Va. 476, 171 S.E.2d 829 (1970). 
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ofRealty's.damage_action, premised on the facts that had been the basis·for 
t:h_e· ~hancery claiin:· "Here nothing was done· in the .chancery suit until the 
day for trial of appellee's law action, at which time a nonsuit w:as taken." 41 
Ne~ther R~lty nor ~h~ defendg~ts moved during the -interim -t~ speed ,_the 
licigatiop.: The Court s~ated simply: 
.. 
.. while the;e was a duty on the part of appell~e to mirumize dam-
ages, ... it did not lose its cause. of action by the delay. Appellants 
· were put on .notice llrimediately they breached their contract that 
appellee would hold them answerable. Had they d!'!Sired ~ JTIOre ex-
peditious resolution of the controversy, it was within their power, 
· as well as th3;t of appellee, to enlist the aid of the co~ in speeding 
the cause.42 · · · 
The Col:r.rt seems to have reached its result ·without an adequate consid-
eratio~ ?f the issues involved, or at 'least without an airillg of> them in its 
opinion. First, the decision: implies that there is an equal obligation on both 
defendant and pl~ntiff to prosecute, an action in which they are. involved. 
The equality of their obligatio~, however,_ is open ~o serious· ques~on. One 
judge has said, for e~mpie, that "I see no reaso~ why the p~rty who •vas 
sued and has no counterclaiin against the phiintiff should take any steps: to 
subject himself to the expense and inconvenience of a trial if the plainti_ff) 
neglect is such as to give the defendant the hope or expetfation that the 
case will. never be tried." 4.a And. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4I.(b) 
provideS: that "[f] or failure. of the plaintiff to prosecute .... .a defendant 
may move for dismissal of an -action or of any claim against him." It. see'ms 
f.air that. the. party who initiates a legal proceeding and . ~eeks to benefit 
from it should bear the greater burden of prosecuting -tt, ·at. the peril of 
dismissal for delay. The Virginia Court provides no explanation of its 
apparent."'cie:w_thatiaimess does not compel .a greater burden of prosecu-
tion.on the plaintiff than the· defendant. · ·· 
: ·Perhaps the- CoUrt: meant: less to suggest that. the burdens ·are equivalent 
than that ~~e defe~dants here _h,ad failed to raise timely obj~ction to. pl:$1.: 
tiff's delay. Many _courts in. the analogous .criminal sphere have );leld. · th~t 
~he-sixth amendment right to a speedy trial comes into play only after the 
accused has complained of delay.44 Thus, the present d~cision possibly means 
only that delay by a plaintiff in a civil action is ~·be ~e~~ed .from the 
4iJi_lit 482, 1~1 S.E.2d it 834. ~ . 
.• 
• 42 Iii. at 48.3, 171.S.E.2d at ins: · 
f;_4~.Tip.;erman·Prods., Int:. v. George K. Garrett Co., 22 F."R.D, S6, 57 .(E.D. Pa. 1958.): 
«E.g., United States v. Lustirian;. 258 F.2d 475; 478 '(2d Cix:),-¥:'ert.·denied, 358-.U.S' 
880 (1958). See generally Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L: REv. 
1587, 1601-09 (1965). • . ~. 
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time of the defendant's objection to it-apparendy a period of n:o .sig-
nificance in this case . 
. · ~e~o~d, the Court made no mention of th~ problem of prejudice. A pas-
sage of ;three and one-half years takes its toll on the memories of parties \lnd 
witnesses, and, at times, on their availa~ility. Similarly, documentary· evi-
d.~nce m~y be damaged or lost during the course of a lengthy delay. Thus, 
ariy significant delay makes reliable fact-finding more difficult, and, in some 
c~es, impossible. Would the· Virginia Court, for example, permit a· plain-
tiff to . prbs~cute an action largely dependent on testimonial eviden<:e after 
· ~ .~elay of ten years, eveh if the defendant failed to object to the delay 
prior'fo th~ ·time of trial? .Presumably,.though it made no mention of the 
fact, the'Cotirt did not. feel that a delay of over three and one-half years 
made .ul:llikely·accurate fact-fip.ding in Jennings; or, perhaps the defendants 
'were. un~ble to show that they were prejudiceq by tl.te delay. 
.. TQird,.the Court did not discuss the public interest that t]lere be no undue 
·delay~ ·in t4e ·disposition of pending cases so that congesti~n in Virgirua 
trial courts can be avoided. Judges generally have inheren,t power to dismiss 
'for faill.ire ·of prosecution by the plaintiff, even without a motion from the 
defendant.45 Presumably, then, the Justices did not think that Realty had 
abused Virginia's judicial process, possibly because it had presented some 
justification for its delay.46 Finally, the Court did not deal with the con-
sideration that very probably underlay its decision-the desirability that, 
except i~ extreme circumstances, disputes be resolved on their medt5.47 
The,~'opportunity to be heard" is a cornerstone of due· process, not easily 
overturned. . . . . . ~ . ' . r •• 
On .baJance, sin,ce. the· defendap.ts apparently failed to object· to· Re~lty's 
delay ~urlrig_.its progress, since they seemed unable to present evidence th~t 
· the ·delay prejudiced their defense, and sfnce it does not appear that Realty~s 
dilatory:.conduct placed inordinate burdens on the trial court's time,. the 
Gourt:·~ fesolution of the prosecution issue was proper .. ~here. were . n_o 
circumstances sufficient to overcome the. presumption in favor·· of. a. trial 
on the 1merits. A delay of three and on~-half years, ~owever; was sufficiendy 
long:>t_o_call for more than a.terserejection by the appellatel.cour~··of .the 
p'r6secution claim. · · .: .': · . · - ,. .· · .. 
. \4riE.g., ~4Uc v. Wabash R.R., 370 u.s. 626, 629-,30 (1962h se~ vA..Co.oE ANN.·§ 8-154 (1957). . ' . . --, .• .. \ ' 
46 Theie was ; clme lag benveen the filing ofthe'bill for spec1fi~ perforroailce and 
its dismissal, and the trial of the law action. 'Appellee's explanation is'that J'portion 
of the time it was endeavoring to pursuade appellants to fulfill th~ir contract, 'and 
'thereafter it.was trying to.effect·a sale of the property., _, .• :-- ,:1. 
•210Va.at4~3,171SE.2dat834-35. ·. . . .. 
; t·47.''Ult should. be kept in mind that dismissal .with: pJ~judice ~a· drastic .sa,nction to 
be applied only in extreme situations." 2B W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE§ 917, at 136-37 (Wright ed. 1961) .. r,:c: ·,;.; .. ;-,.-
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Jurisdictio·n 
One final case dealing with a plea-in-bar is appropriately mentioned 
here for its ruling that even the most fundamental challenges to the pro-
priety of trial need not be resolved before the merits are reached. In Tide-
water Construction Corp. v. Duke,48 a Jones Act case, the defendants argued 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter "because the 
barge on which the plaintiff was working when he was hurt was out of 
service; [the] plaintiff was not a member of the crew; . . . he was not en-
tided to any warranty of seaworthiness, and . . . his exclusive remedy was 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act .•.. " 49 
The defendants unsuccessfully insisted that the court rule on the jurisdic-
tional challenge before submitting the case to the jury on the merits. The 
judge, concluding that "substantially all of the evidence" needed to resolve 
the jurisdictional issues also bore on the merits, ruled that the plea-in-bar 
and the merits should be determined together, thus avoiding the burden of 
two trials. The Court of Appeals upheld his ruling, stating: "The several 
hundred pages of testimony taken on these questions and the outcome of 
the case demonstrate the propriety of this holding .... " so 
Pretrial Steps 
Process 
In two unexceptional federal diversity actions, defendants asked the court 
to quash process served on them under Virginia long-arm statutes. There 
was a bit of whimsy in the choice of Virginia as a forum in Skarpelis v. 
M/T Arthur P.,u an action for $130 said to have been lawlessly deducted 
from the plaintiff's seaman's pay in Boston on December 31, 1967. Plaintiff, 
a Greek national who had never been a resident of Vrrginia, argued that 
a portion of that sum-approximately $2.64-could be attributed to the time 
he was·aboar.d the defendant vessel during a six-hour visit to Newport News 
on December 6, 1967, and thus that a portion of his claim arose in Virginia. 
The court,. however, found that defendants were not doing business in 
Virginia and, accordingly, that no portion of plaintiff's claim arose in Vir-
ginia for process purposes. 
· In Luther Compton & Sons, Inc. v. Community National Life Insurance 
· ~s'iw Va.143, 169 S.E.2d 585 (1969). 
' ,. 
49ld. at 147, 169 S.E.2d at 588 .. 
50 I d. The Court also distinguished its earlier decision in Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 
130 S.E.2d 582 (1963), on these grounds. In Lucas the Court held that the jurisdictional 
issue should have been disposed of before the trial court proceeded to hear the case on 
its merits. · 
51 302 F. Supp.147 (E.D. Va. 1969). 
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Co.,62 however, a federal court in Oklahoma ordered full faith and credit 
given to a final Virginia judgment, after rejecting the arguments of de-
fendant insurance company, an Oklahoma corporation not licensed in Vir-
ginia, that the Commonwealth's process statutes are constitutionally de-
ficient and, if not so deficient, that defendant had not had the requisite 
contacts with Virginia. The court held the pertinent statutes constitutional 
under McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,63 and found that the com-
pany had engaged in four "substantial acts" in i:he Conimonwealth via its 
broker-agent: It had arranged for the medical examination of the insured, 
delivered his policy to him, collected the initial premium, and later sought 
to return the premium and recover the policy, all in Virginia. 
Pleading 
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court of Appeals emphasized the 
unsteady ground upon which trial courts and parties tread when they deal 
with issues beyond or inconsistent with those framed by the pleadings. 
In Buchner v. Kenyon L. Edwards Co.,54 the plaintiff's pleadings sought a 
declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenant on certain property was 
void as against public policy. The trial court held the restriction valid, but 
nonetheless went on to find that it would be unreasonable for the defendants 
to prevent the contemplated use of the property. The Court reversed, stat-
ing that "[i]n holding that the restrictive covenant was not invalid the lower 
court ruled on the sole issue raised by the pleadings .... [T]he court erred 
in going further to pass upon the reasonableness of application of the re-
strictive covenant, an issue beyond the pleadings." 56 
In McLaughlin v. Gholson,66 the parties stipulated that "'the sole issue 
for the Court is its construction of the contract to determine whether under 
its tenns ... the obligation . . . had become void for absence of any sig-
nature of an authorized [Farmers Home Administration] official ... , the 
'defendant agreeing that he has no defense by which to avoid the relief 
prayed for in the Bill of Complaint if such was not the case.' " 51 Although 
the lower court found that no signature was required, it then went on to 
hold that informal FHA approval was required, and that the plaintiff had 
failed to show it. The Court of Appeals reversed, .stating: 
When the court found that no signature by FHA was required by 
the option agreement this was determinative of all matters in con-
troversy .•.. 
52 307 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Okla.1969). 
58 355 u.s. 220 (1957). 
54 210 Va. 502, 171 S.E.2d 676 (1970). 
55[d. at 505, 171 S.E.2d at 678. 
56 210 Va. 498, 171 S.E.2d '816 (1970). 
57[d. at 500, 171 S.E.2d at-817. 
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• • ·: • By -agreeing that he had ·no . defense to the bill of complaint if the 
~option agreement was not void for lack of signature thereto by FHA, 
Gholson. effectively e~ated any other possible_ defenses which nligli.t 
. have ·been available to him. He cannot take the·inconsistent position 
th~t .. if the agreement was valid because no FHA signature was ~e­
. ·quired il: was nevertheless invalid because informal FHA approval 
was _requir;d and ~ot proved. A litigant canno1:.assume l?ositions which 
. :: ;rre mconststent w1th ·~ach other and mutually contradictory.58 . 
•·. TI{ a; s~* vein is Kleirf' v~ National Toddle Rouse Corp., where the 
Court· neh:l' that. \vhen "grounds for a demurrer are voluntarily stated 
therein then only the grounds so stated will be. considered." 59 . The de-
fendants demurred in writing on the ground that allegations in the plain-
titfs'~ pl~eacp~g. 'Y~~C: , factually i:p.consis~ent. Subsequendy,. the defendants 
argued that ·there was.also a misjoinder by plaintiffs of actions ex contractu 
'and .ex gelicto. Th~ C'ou~t held: "Since no inconsistency appears fr9m the 
ple~ding,' it f~llo~s;that the trial court was in error m sustaining. the demur-
rer ori':th.e7 only: written ground assigned [that the allegations -were ~actually 
iricoiisisi:ent]:•• 60 · · · · 
.'f~~·.pi~i~ti~~. m: Pied??!ont Trost. Btz?Zk v. Aetna Casualty i9- Surety Co.61 
allege.~ c~~t:rnc~ve fra.ud a~ one of their grounds for relief. 'J;'he Cot;~rt used 
.t~~ir. ow;t: plf?adings to defe'a! .theJ?J: "It is regarded as fundamental that 
fraJi1 1c~p,~6~ ~erpredicateo upo~ what amo~n~ to a m~re eh.'Pression of an ~pf~??··;): :.~er~,.~d~{'the facts._s~t forth m the pleadings! w~ .are clea:ly 
dealing with an expr~~Pl'} of oprmon by the repres~ntatives of the m-
s~ance c~mpanies:" 6~ "Fron:( appellants' plea~~gs, it affi.rmatively.appears 
tha~ appell;u~ts did nqt .rely on the opinions expresse~ by .the repres~~tatives 
of. the i~anc~. ~o~paQies but. ~onducted thei! o~v.n if} dependent )itvesti-
gatiori by ~eeking and obtaining the opinion ~f an outside expert. Hence the 
.element, of 'reliance, an essential element of fraud, was .absent 'and, in those 
circufi)~i:,k~~~,, t4e-!'e cp~~ be no fraud. Thus the bill was properlY, subject 
to demurrer." 63 · 
' . ' •: 
· ·6$ ia.~a.t sO:r; 11f s.E.2d at 818. : · .. · ·. · ·· · · · · 
59 210 Va. 641, 643, 172 S.E.29 782.; 783 (1970). 
60 Id. at 644, 172 S.E.2d at 7S4; cf. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 210 Va. 354, 
357,'17l:.S:.E.~d 239, 241" (1~49); wh~re th~ Court stllte9~ ·"There is no evidence in the 
recoJd: upon:which 'the ·cou.~:"£01l}:d ·,i}ave:m~de any finding of fact. All that the court 
had before it were Symple's motion for judgment; Nationwide's grounds ol defense; 
ancL Martin's. motion.for .an .order-confirming-the. compromise." 
61210 Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264 (1969). -· -' 
62Jd. at 399,171 S.E.2d at267. 
63 !d. at 400, 171 S.E.2d at 267. Similarly, in Cales vYChesapeake & 0. Ry., 300 F. Supp. 
155, 157-58 (W.D. Va. 1969), the court dismissed the proceeding because the plaintiff's 
"allegations pertaining to the wrongful discharge are insufficient [under Virgiilia· l:iwl 
to state a cause of action upon which relief may be grintetl : ~ • ." ; • · ·. 
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Discovery: Rakes v. Fulcher 
In McLaughlin v. Gholson the Justic;es broadly declare·d: "This court 
looks with favor upon the use of stipulations, admissions, discovery and 
other pre-trial techniques which are designed to narrow the issues and ex-
pedite the trial or settlement of litigation." (l4 In a major case of·fust impres-
sion, Rakes v. Fulcher, 65 the Court had an opportunity to give substance to 
its declaration with regard to the production of documents and other tan-
gible things. 
Plaintiff Rakes sued Fulcher and his employer for bodily injuries that she 
allegedly sustained as a result of the negligent operation of a tractor-trailer 
owned by the employer and operated by Fulcher in the course of his emploY:-
merit. Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion ·pursuant to Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals Rule 4:9 asking the court to require the defendants "to 
produce· all written statements of witnesses interviewed and. all narratives 
and written reports of claims adjusters relative to their investigative activi-
ties and contacts with possible witnesses relating to the accident." 66 Rakes' 
supporting affidavit stated that she believed that " 'immediately upon the 
occurrence of the accident or soon thereafter,' the defendants, through their 
agents or agents of their insurance carrier, conducted an invest;igation of 
the facts and circumstances leading up to the accident; that the information 
requested was necessary and important to prove the negligence of Fulcher 
and it was not readily available to plaintiff." 67 · In a lat~r affidayit, Rakes 
stated that the documents were needed to resolve a suspected inconsistency 
or incompleteness in the statement of a certain witness. On the sail)e day 
that plaintiff filed her Rule 4:9 motion, ·she also filed interrogatpries-:asking 
for the names and addresses of all persons known to defendants who, knew 
of the facts of the accident. The trial judge denied· the motion for discovery 
of the documents on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show "good 
cause" for their production. The judge did, however, approve the requested 
interrogatories. 
Rule 4:9 provides in pertinent part: .... 
Upon motion of any party showing good. ·cause. therefor and upon 
. notice to all other parties, ... the. court in which an action i,s pending 
may (I) order any party to produce and permit 1:he inspe~tion and 
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the ·moving party, of 
any designated documents, paper's, books,. ·accoqnts, · letters, photo-
64210 Va. 498,500,171 S.E.2d 816,817 (1970}. See'also City of Portsmouth v. 
Cilumbrello, 204 Va. 11, 129 S.E.2d 31 (1963}; Craig, New Virginia Rules for Deposition 
and Discovery, 53 VA. L. REv. 1818, 1821 (1967}; · 
65.210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970}. 
66]d. at 544, 172 S.E.2d at 754. 
67]d. 
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graphs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, ·which constitUte 
. or contain evidence .relating to. any of the matte,rs within the scope 
of. the examination permitted by Rule 4: 1 (b) and which are in his 
. possessio~, custody, or control .... 
. Thus Rakes_ concerns the circumstances in which a litigant can compel 
the production of documents or other tangible items. Before dealing with 
the specific issue presented by the case's facts, it will be helpful to outline 
the general problem of the production of tangible things. 68 At the outset 
it 'is well to niake clear that two grounds for the denial of discovery-that 
the material sought is privileged or irrelevant to the subject matter of the 
action-~re not at issue here. It may be assumed that the tangible things 
in question are unprivileged and relevant to the action. If proper, denial of 
discovery must rest on another ground. 
There are different types of tangible' things. For our purposes, two broad 
categories ;may be identified: those documents or things prepared for litiga-
ti~n and those not ·so prepared. The latter may have arisen in the ordinary 
cohrse of b~ess, to satisfy public requirements not related to the litigati.on 
in question, ·or for some other reason unrelated to it. 69 Confusion has been 
created by the failure of the pertinent discovery rules to distinguish clearly 
between the two categories of tangible things. Both Virginia Rule 4:9 and 
its model, old Federal Rule 34,70 can be read to require that "good cause" 
be· shown before any tangible thing-whether prepared for litigation or not 
-will be ordered produced. Confusion from this source has been heightened 
by the existence of two distinct ways of verbalizing the qualified immunity 
from discovery enjoyed by tangible things: on the one hand, the simple 
"good catise1' language of the rules and on the other, the "necessity or 
justification"· language of Hiclmzan v. Taylor,71 the seminal decision in the 
area. Courts have been 'uncertain how these two verbalizations relate to one 
another-wHether the· qualified immunity granted by the rules' "good cause" 
68 See generally 2A W. BARRoN & A. HoLTZOFF, supra note 47, §§ 652-52.2, 652.4; 
JunxCIAL CoNFERENCE oF THE UNITED STATES, CoMMITIEE ON RULES oF PRACTICE AND 
PRoCEDVRE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRoPOSED .AMENDMENTS TO RULEs OF CML PROCEDURE 
FoR~ UNI®' SrA'Iis'Dxsnucr CoURTs RELATING ro DEPosmoN AND.Discom.Y 17-27, 
69-70 (No-vi. 1967);· C. WRmin, FEDERAL CouRTS 360-69, 386-89 (2d ed. 1970). Craig, 
supra nbte 64, at i835:39. . · . . . . · 
69.E.g., ·ooosritan v. A. Duie pYle, Inc., 320·F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963). 
70 'fh;e .Coutt bf ·Appeals noted in Rakes that while ''Ru1e 4:9 was adopted by this. 
court on November 29, 1966, to become effective February 1, 1967, and there are no 
Virginia cases!futerpreting it," 210 Va_ at 545, 172 S.E.2d at 754, it is "substantially the 
satite ·as RUJ.e-134 ·of: the 'Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure : • • and both counsel urge 
us to consider the federal cases interpreting. the rule." Jd., 172 S.E.2d at 755. This the 
Court did. After Rakes was handed down, the pe¢neQ.t federal rules. were ·amended. 
See text at notes 91-93 infra. . . 
'll 329 u.s. 495, 510 (1947). ·. '-: 
Practice and· Pieading 1515 
is lesser than that granted by Hickman. Nor have courts been certain wheth-
er tu 'grant the same immunity to all documents and things, whatever their 
type. 
A brief look at Hickman will be helpful. After the tug John M. Taylor 
simk drowning several crewmen, its owners hired a lawyer to defend them 
against any litigation from the sinking. Less than two months later the 
survivors· testified at a public hearing; their testimony was available to the 
plaintiff. The owners' lawyer then interviewed the witnesses privately and 
obtained-from them signed statements regarding the sinking. He interviewed 
other persons whom he believed to have pertinent information and made 
memoranda of what they said. Seven months after the accident, the ad-
ministrator of one of the victims sued. Among the interrogatories that he 
presented to the defendants was one demanding that they" '[s]tate whether 
any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 
'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the tow-
ing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor.' Attach 
hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in 
detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports.' " 72 The 
defendants refused to cooperate and the Supreme Court upheld their refusal. 
The Supreme Court in Hickman· indic~ted clearly the type of tangible 
things with which it was dealing, stating the issue to be "the extent to which 
a party may inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses, or oth~r 
information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course of prepara-
tion for possible litigation after a claim has arisen." 73 The Court made 
equally clear that its primary concern was to protect the proper function-
ing of the adversary system by preventing interference with the thought 
processes and work of attorneys: ''Not even the most liberal of discovery 
theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental im-
pressions of an attorney." 74 On this basis the Court distinguished between 
written and oral statements given a lawyer, since the production of the 
72Jd. at 498-99. 
73Jd. at 497 (emphasis added). 
74Jd. at 510. The Court explained: 
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [his attorney] assemble infor-
mation, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare 
his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interfer-
ence .•.• This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, 
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs and countless other 
tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court 
·of Appeals in this case as the "work product of the lawyer." Were such materials 
open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in 
writing would remain unwritten. Any attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, 
would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably 
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. 
I d. at 511. 
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latter necessarily "forces the attorn_ey to testify as t<:>; what- P€1 rem<::mber~ 
or what he saw ~t tq write down regarding witnesses' remarks." 75 ,:"t~u.!?, 
"as to oral statements made by witnesses [to the lawyer], whether pr~j 
endy in the form of his mental impressions or memoranda, we: 'do. riot believe 
that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of;'this 
case so as to justify production.?' 76 Written statements or· doc~ents, on 
the other hand, generally show less of the attorney's thought processes. 
These, the Court held, are subject to only a qualified immunity; which can 
be overcome by a showing of "necessity or justification;" that is, by a show-
ing that the '~denial of such production would unduly p~ejudice the prep-' 
aration of petitioner's case oi cause him ... hardship or injustice." 77 Again, 
" [ w] here relevant and non.: privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's 
file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of 
one's case, discovery may properly be had." 78 
Among the occasions mentioned by the Court when "producti6n might 
be justified" is "where the witneSses are no longer availab~e or can be 
reached only .with difficulty." 70 The Court felt no necessity was shown 
in Hickman bec~usethere the pla~tiff sought the statemen~ of "wi~esses 
whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner appears 
unimpaired," so and: because the "petitioner was free to exa~e the pub4~ 
testimony of the witnesses'; 81 at the public hearing held two months 'aft~ 
the sinking-:-a--time when presUll1al;>ly the details of the event would still 
have been fresh in·- the minds of the witnesses. Moreover,. as the. Court 
stressed, the plaintiff · by his interrogatories had already forced the·· de-
fendants to turn over all of the facts about the sinking that they··pos.:. 
sessed.s2 It appears that the Court felt that the plaintiff suffered no sig-
nificant prejudice from the denial of production. The Court . iriight ·well 
have found prejudice, however, had the plaintiff shown that even thougl:\. 
the witnesses remained available he could not obtain statements from theni 
substantially equivalent to those obtairied by the defendants-:-because, for 
75/d. at 513. It also "gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrust:WOJ;t)li-
ness.". !d. 
76Jd. at 512. 
77 !d. at 509. 
78/d. at 511. 
79/d. Or whim "[s]uch ~ritten St::\tements·and documents might •.• be admissible in 
evidence or give clues as to the -existence or location of relevant facts. Or ••• be useful 
for purposes of impeacftment or· corroboration." !d • 
. so !d. at 508. · .. 
81/d. at 509.' 
S2'Jd. at 507, 5i3. 
• l 
• I > ~ 
: ' : !j~ .\. t 
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·example, the witnesses .were hostile, or their memories had dimmed or 
Iaps~d,since they gave the written statements.83 
-Although no. Supreme. Court decisions have spoken to what immunity, 
if any, shoula be given to those documents and things not obtained or pre-
pared for litigation, lower federal courts have . generally given them less 
pro.tection than that afforded materials prep:tred for litigation: "With re-
spect to documents not obtail;ted or prep~ed with an eye to litigation, the 
decisions; while not uniform, . reflect a- strong and incr~?Siq.g tendency to 
relate 'good cause' to a showing that the documents are relevant to the 
subject matter of the action." 84 This practice is certainly in accord :with 
the Supreme Conrt's declaration in Hickman that "deposition-discovery 
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment." 85 
{Jnl~s prepared for litigation, tangible things do not possess special char-
. acterist,ics sufficient to justify treating them differently than other non-work 
product subjects of discovery. Like the latter, they do not d!.rectly reflect 
an attorney's thoughts, and they may provide information essential to the 
effective functioning of the adversary .. system. Thus, tangible things not 
prepared for litigation are appropriately discovered if relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the action and non-priviliged. In this regard, ii: is significant 
that -the "good cause requirement was originally inserted in [old Federal] 
Rule 34 as a general protective provision in the absence of experience with 
the ~pecific .problems that would arise thereunder." 86 Thus, ·the require-
ment did not spring from a considered judgment that all tangible things 
need special protection. Subsequent empirical study has shown that, except 
w4er~: preparation for litigation is involved, the "good' cause~' requirement 
has 'Rf9V.ed unnecessary.87 Little evidence has been found of attempts by 
,.attorneys tO use discovery to unfairly coerce opponents. 88 And " [ t J he data 
sa See the' cas~· cited in PREUMINARY DRAFT oF PRoPoSED AMENDMENTs TO Rirr.Es oF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 68, at 25. 
84Jd. at 22. Regarding the standard for determining relevance, Professor \Vright has 
stated that ~'it is not too strong to say that discovery should be considered relevant 
w,her~ there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the 
subj~cJ; 'matter of the action"-the fact that the evidence sought would be inadmissible 
not bJirig a ground for objection if the ev1dence seems reasonably ·cillculated to lead 
'to ~e 'discovery of admissible evidence. C. WRIGHT, ·supra note 68, at 359. 
-'S51J~9 U.S: at 507. . . · · , · . 
' ~6'PRELIMINARY DRAF-r 'OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF' ,CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
.w.Praltlpte 68, "llf69. . 
:87 .A:Atpdy of ~he operation of the discovery rules was made for ~he- Judicial Con-
. ference's. 9ommi~ee on Rules of Practice, and Pr9cedure by the Project for Effective 
Justice; _at Columbia University. The study is described and its findihgs pr~ented in 
w: GLA'SEI{. PiurrRIAL DzscovERY AND: THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968) .' · For a discussion 
of its scope and methodology, see id. at 38-50. Among the areas 'Surv~yed Wi!S~the 
Western District of Virginia. · 
ss See id. at 117-23, 129-34. .·:: · '; '. :'· 
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suggest that the requirement to show 'good cause' has little effect on the 
use of inspections," 89 since "most inspections .... occur by notice, regard-
less of the language of Rule 34. Most lawyers cooperate with their .adver-
saries, avoid the time-consuming preparation of papers and visits to court, 
and inspect and submit to inspections by informal agreement." 90 · -
It is true that the absence of a good cause requirement for the discovery 
of tangible things could give the lazy attorney undeserved assistance. Such 
lawyers would be tempted to make minimal trial preparation and rely in-
stead on discovery to provide them with the requisite information. This 
fact of life, however, is inherent in discovery as a whole; it is an unfortunate 
but tolerable by-product of ensuring that legal opponents have sufficient 
knowledge of the facts to make the adversary system work. 
It is important to remember, also, that Virginia courts have broad powers 
under Rule 4: 5 (b) to respond to a party's need for privacy or secrecy and 
to prevent the imposition on him of undue burdens. Thus, a good cause 
rule is not necessary to protect those non-work product, tangible things 
genuinely in need of immunity from discovery, since immunity for those 
things can be obtained through a protective order. Reliance on such 
orders has the merit not only of avoiding the needless protection of some 
things but also of making clear the process in which the court should be 
involved-one of identifying and weighing competing interests and of deny-
ing discovery only when the "cause" for production advanced by the 
would-be discoverer is less "good" than that advanced by his adversary for 
protection. 
Effective July 1970, the United States Supreme Court revised the per-
tinent federal rules to take current practice into account and to end the 
"good cause" ambiguity. Regarding tangible things prepared for litigation 
(work product), the Court added a new section to Rule 26(b)(3) which 
provides in pertinent part: 
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things ... 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his at-
torney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon 
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without 
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials 
by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the 
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against dis-
closure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theo-
89Jd. at 221. 
90 Id. at 220. 
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ries of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation.91 . 
Thus, the Court has explicitly written Hickman into the rules. As that 
opinion suggested, the lawyer's mental processes are to be protected as 
much as possible. Work product is to be ordered produced only after a 
showing by the would-be discoverer of substantial need and an inability 
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material 
held by his adversary. Good cause, so far as it relates to work product, 
is thus defined by the rigorous Hickman standard. New Rule 26(b)(3) 
also resolves an issue left open in Hickman: whether the immunity extends 
only to the work product of an attorney or whether it also covers materials 
gathered by others, presumably for trial counsel's use and often under his 
guidance.92 It covers both. · 
Regarding tangible things not prepared for litigation, the Supreme Court 
has struck any requirement of good cause from new Rule 34. Further, such 
items may be inspected without court order. Rule 34 as revised provides 
that "[a]ny party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce 
and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, 
to inspect and copy, any designated documents ... or to inspect and copy, 
test, or sample any tangible things ... which are in the possession, custody 
or control of the party upon whom the request is served .... " 93 Thus, a 
showing that non-work product things are not privileged and that they are 
relevant to the subject matter of the action will justify production. 
Against this background, the Virginia Court's opinion in Rakes is some-
what veiled in its reading of Rule 4:9. The Court opened its analysis of the 
Rule with a broad statement: 
One purpose of discovery procedures is to obtain evidence in the 
sole possession of one party and unobtainable by opposing counsel 
through independent means. But more than mere relevancy to the 
issue of the documents sought is necessary; the movant must show 
good cause .... 94 
After comment on the nature of good cause and of work product, the Court 
concluded by stating: 
We interpret good cause as used in our Rule 4:9 to mean that before 
any party is entitled to the production of documents or other tangible 
91 398 u.s. 983 (1970). 
92 Though the courts have divided over the issue, persuasive authority exists for the 
extension of the immunity to the work product of nonlawyers. See, e.g., Alltmont 
v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). 
98 398 u.s. 997-98 (1970). 
94 210 Va. at 545-46, 172 S.E.2d at 755. 
1520 Virginia Law _Review [Vol. 56;:1~00 
.. ", .. ~hings, such as are· inyqlv_e9d.n _this <;;as~. tP,~re nmst be a- showjng of 
' some special circumstances in addition to relevancy. Di.scovery pro-
cedures were not intended to open an attorney's files to opposing 
coul}Sel;.nor wer~ they intended to afford an attorney the luxury of 
. , having opposing counsel investigate hi~ case fQr him.95 
. ' 
, In the~ ~-~~ent pn good cause? the Justices inade. clear that th~ ~~~uire­
_mel,lt is not ~et by the "mere asser~on by affi~avit that discoyery i,s neces-
sary Jar a movant to invest_ig:1te fully and prep~e his case." 9u N.~i~h~r .is it 
sat;isfied "wh,en the moving party has not sho~ a bona fide e~~rt. to- obtain 
.the information by independent investigation," nor by "the :mery suspicion 
. of counsel that. [a witness] R.ad ~ade inc~nsistent and incomplete .sta~yments 
.: .• •.• " 
97 These rulings 011.~~-nature of good cam;~?apparently apply-.~9:the 
discovery of all tangible items, whether work product or nqt:~, So fru;:,p.~ _tpe 
latter is concerned, the Co~ s~ted: ·. ::•: · 
i ) r•· ,. · \ ' · • • •. · · •• ~-· ·• • • 7 • 1 • 
'.;:: ·. '. \vi~~ the sc~pe of q,.e ·good cause rl;lle .is the "war~ produ,ct'~:s}oc­
... · . triQe1 whichl?rotec~s an att:c;>rney- from ?Pening his files for ~pec~on 
... , . _by an oppost!lg attq:r;n,ey. This doctrme, however, do.es .. h()t offer 
. --_; absolute ~ljnity, ah~ discovery. will'be ~ermitted whe~~ \-~~~;~i!l~ 
· '' ,. : of nec;:esSity ·greater thaq the normal requrrement for _g?od"'ca'Us.e. lS 
·: ~'·· made .... Alltmont v.: United States, 177- F.2d 971 (3d Cir;'l950);"has 
, extended the work product 'doctrine to perso~' obtaifllng 1stat~fu'ents 
of witnesses for u5e ·of' trial counsel. ... Where both' partjes·:have 
an .equal opportUnity to investigate~ and where all the witnesses to the 
. accident are known ~nd available to bo_th sides, discovery should' not 
·_, >.be granted.-lls . . ... - ..;·, . : ~ . . . . '" . . 
... 
. . ' 
The threshold uncertainty in Rakes is what distinction the Court of 
. Appeals i~tends to draw between-·~ork product; a~a .those- t:;angible things 
'not prepared. for 'litigatio~. Tlie opinion -noted that- disc:Ove.ry: of. work 
product ieqriires "a shoWirig~ Of ·necessitf gi'eater•than the-normal r~quire­
ment for good cause," and referred to "documents or other tangible things, 
such as are involved in this case." 99 But the rest of the opinion appears to 
;deg,!,with g<;>~g.cause criteri~. a~ th~Y. relat~. to alldocumen~._a_nd tangible 
things, not simply to work product. Perhaps the import of -t:he: helcl!qg -is 
that plaintiff Rakes lacked good cause for discovery even had she sought 
: n.on-work product documertts. · 
:. 'A· second issue lett"unclear:Ei~t~~-~o~t-~~~hy doc:~ents and things not 
... -.9Ud .. at54,7,172S.E.2dat756. , ., · ·- .. ·.-< 
:·;,).~itt at 5,46,l72·S.E.2d at 755 .. '-"; : . :.. ::. --' .. ·-. . , , . 
" "'97]a.'at"s%. .548, 112 s.E.2d-at 75·s.i56.::.. · · .. -·, · · - · .· 
98/d. at 546~7, 172 S.E.Zd ati55-56 (p~agraphiilg ~ritted) •. '. ·-; · .. ·_- ·: ·-:_' .. ·. ··· : · 
99/d. (emphasis added). .":?.~ :.: ;';·:.'," ·:· _ • · -::: .• • ·.,' ~·;: .· 
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prepared· for litigation should be given special protection from discovery, as 
Rakes would seem to require. This protection might be given in Virginia 
either because the Court believes that the language of Rule 4:9 precludes 
the elimination of a good cause requirement for non-work product things, 
or because as a matter of policy the JusticeS think that tangible material 
not prepared for litigation should have a qualified immunity. But if the 
former, and if the Court relies on the ''plain meaning" of the rule's provi-
sions, where in those provisions is there a "plain" indication that work 
product is entided to "a showing of necessity greater than the normal re-
quirement for good cause?" 
Third, the factors which the Virginia Court wishes taken into account 
in determining good cause remain somewhat uncertain. The Justices upheld 
denial of production in Rakes because 
the plaintiff offered no evidence to dispute the statements in the affi-
davit filed by defendants' counsel that defendants, their agents, or 
agents of their insurer did not interview or obtain statements from 
witnesses "immediately upon the occurrence of the accident or as 
soon thereafter," and that no investigation was begun on behalf of 
defendants until after the present action was instituted. 
Thus plaintiff's counsel had the opportunity to make an investiga-
tion and to interview the witnesses before defendants, their agents, or 
the agents of their insurer. The names and addresses of witnesses were 
available to counsel from the trooper who investigated the accident. 
Plaintiff also obtained the names and addresses of all witnesses known 
to defendants through interrogatories. The fact that plaintiff's counsel 
was employed only a short time before the action was brought and 
that plaintiff was unable to assist counsel in any way, because she was 
incapacitated, does not change the situation here.too 
It appears that the Court was most concerned with Rakes' equal "oppor-
tunity to investigate" and with the continued availability of witnesses. These 
facto.t:s are, of course, important. But how substantial a showing of need 
for the documents ·sought must the would-be discoverer make? What if, 
though a party had an equal or even better opportunity to investigate than 
his adversary, he failed to do so and now.has substantial need for the docu.,. 
ments? What if, though witnesses are still available, a would-be discoverer 
can no longer obtain from them the substantial equivalent of the writte~ 
statements possessed by his adversary? More fundamentally, is the Virginia 
Court primarily concerned with denying "an. attorney the luxury of having 
opposing counsel investigate his case for Jllm" or with giving each party 
access to that material necessary- to eliminate surprise and facilitate reliable 
~a~~-finding? . , _ · 
100 /d. at 547, 172 S.E.2d at 756. 
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. Li,mited tO its facts, Rakes seeins correctly 'decided. First, the documents 
sought were clearly work product. Second, the plaintiff apparently made 
no showing .of substantial need for them. The witnesses were known to 
her and remained readily available for examination. Finally, the plaintiff 
does not appear to have presented convincing evidence that she would have 
been· unable to obtain testimony from the witnesses substantially equivalent 
to that already held by defendants. 
To the extent that Rakes goes beyond the facts presented, however, and 
indicates that non.:work product things are entitled to special protection, 
the decision does not appear wise. For reasons already stated,1°1 there seems 
insufficient reason to provide such protection. Should the Court .feel that 
the present wording of Rule 4:9 prevents the elimination of a good cause 
requirement for non-work product material, it would be well for.it to con-
si~er ame~dments similar to those recently made in the federal rules. 
Trial 
Trial errors .made by counsel were fatal to numerous appeals during the 
past year. The·Court pointed to the terminal nature of (1) failing to raise 
first in the trial court an issue later directed to the appellate court, 102 (2) fail-
ing' to raise timely or adequately precise objection in the trial court to judicial 
rulings later appealed,103 and (3) failing to request first from the trial judge 
any. affirmative step later urged on appeal.104 As the Justices made clear in 
Reil v. Commonwealth/05 the fact that a contention has merit will not 
overcome its faulty presentation below. During Reil's embezzlement trial, 
· 101 See text at pages 1517-18 supra. 
102 Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 210 Va. 769, 773, 173 S.E.2d 855, 
858 (1970); Thrasher v. Thrasher, 210 Va. 624, 628-29, 172 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1970); cf. 
Edwards v. Jackson, 210 Va. 450, 171 S.E.2d 854 (1970). In Edwards the Court held 
that judgment for a plaintiff under the survival statute moots any claim to join the 
survival action with one under the death by wrongful act statute, when the plaintiff 
has not claimed a ·right to recover under both. 
103 Haymo!e v. Brizendine, 210 Va. 578, 580-81, 172 S.E.2d 774, 776-77 (1970) (failure 
to object to· condition of new trial imposed on leave to amend pleading); R;tkes v. 
Fttlcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1970) (failure to object to form jury 
verdict before jury discharged); Reil v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 369, 372, 171 S.E.2d 
162,- 1<l4-6S (1969) . (failure to object to introduction of letter as privileged cOJI1muni-
~tion); Tid~water Constr. Corp. v. Duke, 210 Va. 143, 147-48, 169 S.E.2d 585, 588-89 
p969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 938 (1970) (failure to object to introduction· of deposition 
on proper grounds,and failure to object to jury inst;ruction when given) •. 
> 104 Haymore v. Brizendine, 210 Va. 578, Sill, 172 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1970) ("[C]ounsel 
did not offer an instrriction that recovery • • • could be predicated on • • • simple 
negligence. The court committed no error in failing to do what courisel had not 
asked it to do.") 
105 210 Va. 369, 171 S.E.2d 162 (1969), noted in Schwartz, Evidence, 1969-1910 Annual 
Survey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1326-27, 1334-35 (1970). · · 
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his counsel made .a general objection to the introduction of a letter to the 
defendant from his wife. "This letter," said the Court, "if proper objection 
had been made and exception noted, was inadmissible as a privileged com-
munication . . . . Defendant's counsel did not object, however, on the 
ground, that the letter was a privileged communication. Rather, he made a 
general objection, which the trial judge interpreted as an objection that the 
~etter was irrelevant . . . . Thus, proper objection was no.t made in com-
pliance with Rule 1: 8 . . . ." lOG This Rule provides: 
· In civil and criminal cases, all objections to writs of every kind, 
pleadings, instructions, notices, the admissibility of evidence, or other 
matters requiring a ruling or judgment of the trial court, shall state 
with reasonable certainty the ground of objection, and unless it appears 
from the record to have been so stated, such objections will not be 
considered by this Court except for good cause shown, or to enable 
this Court to attain the ends of justice. 
The Court then noted, as it has in the past, that this rule is designed to avoid 
the delay and expense of appeals and reversals for errors that might have 
been avoided or corrected by a properly informed trial judge. It seems 
clear ·that counsel who wish to ensure an appellate decision on the merits 
must take care to leave no procedural stone unturned below. 
Similarly, within the bounds of honesty, counsel would do well to see 
that their clients do not give decisive force to adverse testimony by the 
nature of their own testimony, or by a failure adequately to rebut hostile 
evidence. In Crawford v. Quartemzan,l07 the Court of Appeals reversed a 
judgment for plaintiff on the ground that "[p]laintiff cannot expect the 
court to disregard his testimony. His case can be no stronger nor rise any 
higher than his own testimony permits." On reviewing the evidence, the 
Court found that plaintiff's testimony supported that of one of the de-
fendants and ruled out negligence .on his part. By the same token, the 
uncontradicted testimony of an adverse witness can also result in a party's 
downfall. In Beale v. ]ones,108 the defendant had been found negligent, and 
the trial court had entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals 
disposed of the case by finding that "[t]he testimony of [the adverse wit~ 
ness] is clear, reasonable and uncontradicted that [defendant's] presence and 
conduct did not 'detract' his attention from the road ahead and that he kept 
his 'eyes on the road because [he] had to see what was in front of [him]! 
lOG 210 Va. at 372, 171 S.E.2d at 164. 
107 210 Va. 598, 603, 172 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1970), noted in Torts, 1969-1970 Annual 
SUT'Vey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1424-25 (1970). · · 
10s 210 Va. 519, 171 S.E.2d 851 (1970). 
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The record· shows that [the witness] underwent a rigorous examination: as 
an adverse witness." 1oo 
In Fisher v. Gordon,U0 the Court recited the hoary rules governing the 
inferences to be drawn on a motion· to strike and the rules determining 
which questions of negligence are to be left to the jury and which are to 
be decided by the judge as a matter of law. In a 4 to 3 decision, the 
Justices then reversed·a summary judgment for the defendant entered below 
on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter- Qf 
law.111 Fisher was the only practice and pleading case of this Survey period 
that divided the Court. The dissenters "disagree[d] with the majority opin-
ion that the appellant was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. She made: a left turn under hazardous .~eather conditions direcrly 
11cross the path of appellee's car which·was overtaking and pas~ng her. A 
glance to lier left, however fleeting, immediately before beginriing hef' turn 
would have revealed the other vehicle." 112 The factual emph~s of the 
dissent is indicative of the thrust of many of the Court's procedural deci-
~ions: Often the legal principles at stake are well established, and contro-
versy centers only upon whether they have been properly applied to the 
facts. As a rule, such cases could safely be left to an intermediate appellate 
court, and their frequent appearance on the docket of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals provides notable incentive for the creation of such an interme-
~iate appellate body in Virginia.113 
In Rakes v. Fulcher, 114 the Court held that it is not improper for a judge 
to give the jury form verdicts, one of which they may choose upon reach-
ing a decision. The Justices also concluded that it is not error for a .trial 
judge to enter judgment for both a master and his servant, in an action 
where the former's liability is predicated upon that of the latter, even when 
the name of the master is not mentioned in the verdict returned by the 
109 I d. at 522, 171 S.E.2d at 853. . 
110 210 Va. 523, 526, '171 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1970), noted in Torts, 1969-1970 Annual 
Survey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1420-21 (1970). 
111 Cf. Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (19,69). 
Plaintiff in Whitfield claimed error in the deletion of the word "possess" from a, trial 
court instruction that "lilt was the duty of the defendant ••• to possess and exercise 
such reasonable ~d ordinary skill ••• as are ordinarily exercised by the average of the 
members of her profession •••• " Jd. at 180, 169 S.E.2d at 566. Plaintiff argued that 
the deletion of "possess" took from the jury the question whether or not the defendant 
possessed the requisite skill. The Court upheld the deletion on the ground that "all the 
evidence showed that [the defendant) did possesS th~ p.JOoper training and requisite 
skill •••. " Jd. at 181, 169 S.E.2d at 566-67. 
112 210 Va. at 528, 171 S.E.2d at 839. 
113See generally Lilly & Scalia, Appel!ate~]ttstice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L. 
REv. 1 (1971). 
114 210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970). 
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jury. The Court stated that. under these circumstances "a verdict in favor 
of the servant requires a verdict for the master also." 115 
Appeal 
Rule ):1 
Holland v. Bliss.116-The Court of Appeals in Holland reaffirmed the nec-
essity that a party hew to the letter of the explicit time limits for perfecting 
an appeal. The case was resolved on a motion to dismiss the appeal for 
appellant's failure to designate the parts of the record to be printed in time 
for the record to be retained by the trial court clerk for twenty' days. Prior 
to its recent amendment,117 Rule 5:1, section 6(a) stated that:"[n]ot less 
than twenty days before the record is transmitted, counsel {or appellaqt 
shall file with the clerk [of the trial court] a designation of the parts of the 
record that he wishes printed:" Old section 7 of the iule provided that the 
record then had to remain in the clerk's office for at, least twenty days; 
unless transmission was requested sooner by all counsel. Rule 5:4, in turn, 
states that the record is to be filed with the Supreme Court of Appeals clerk 
"within the time allowed by statute for presenting a petition for appeal"--::: 
four months from the date of the final order, under Virginia Code section 
8-463. Although the final order in Holland was handed down on March 27, 
1968, appellant did not designate parts of the record until July 11, 1968. 
To enable him to present his petition to the Court before the expiration 
of the time for appeal, the clerk released the record to appellant's counsel 
on July 24th, and he delivered it that day to a Justice. "Thus," said the 
Court, "the record remained in the clerk's office only thirteen' days before 
being released to counsel for the plaintiff, rather than the twenty days 
required by Rule 5:1, § 7. Counsel for the defendant did not consent to 
early transmittal of the record. The clerk was without authority to release 
the record as he did on July 24, 1968, and it was not, therefore, properly 
filed with this court. . . . The cited rules are mandatory and jurisdictional 
.•.. Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules requires dismissal of 
his appeal." 118 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, lnc.119-While Holland fits -readily into 
Virginia precedent affirming the sanctity of the precise temporal require-
115 !d. at 549, 172 S.E.2d at 757; cf. Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714, 718 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), discussed at notes 30-33 supra. 
116 210 Va. 460, 171 S.E.2d 687 (1970). 
117 See text at note 135 infra. , 
118 210 Va. at 461, 171 S.E.2d at 688. See also Buchner v. Kenyon L. Edwards .Co., 
210 Va. 502,505, 171 S.E.2d 676,678 (1970). -
119 208 Va. cxiii (1967), vacated & remanded, 392 U.S. 657, reordered, 209 Va. 279, 
163 S.E.2d 588 (1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). · · 
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ments for appeal,120 Sullivan cannot be so easily reconciled with prior deci-
sions of the Court. The Sullivan cases involved the more abstract require-
ments of Rule 5:1, section 3(f), which, as pertinent here, provides (1) that 
" [ c] ounsel tendering the transcript .•. shall give opposing counsel reason-
able written notice of the time and place of tendering it;" (2) that he ?hall 
also provide "a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true 
copy of it;" and (3) that "[t]he signature of the judge, without more, will 
be deemed tO: be his certification that counsel had the required notice and 
opportunity, and that the transcript ... is authentic." 
The Sullivan cases involved alleged discrimination against a black family 
in the use of community recreational facilities. After their complaints were 
dismissed in the trial court, plaintiffs began preparation of the record for 
appeal. On June 9, 1967, plaintiffs' counsel notified defendants' counsel by 
telephone that he would submit the transcript to the trial judge that day. 
He wrote defendants' attorney to the same effect, indicating also that he 
was filing motions to correct and that he would request the judge to allow 
a ten-day period in which opposing counsel might inspect and consent or 
object to the transcript. The letter was received on the following Monday, 
June 12th. Since the judge had been absent from his chambers when the 
transcript was delivered on June 9, he ruled that he received it on June 12th. 
When the motions to correct were heard on June 16th, the court dedined 
to act until defendants' counsel had a further opportunity to examine the 
transcript, and he was personally given a copy to inspect. Three days later, 
on June 19th, he informed plaintiffs' counsel that he had no objections to 
the transcript as corrected and signed the proposed orders which plaintiffs' 
attorney had prepared. The orders were then submitted to the judge who 
signed the transcript on June 20, without objection by the defendants. 
The Virginia Court refused to review the Sullivan cases on the ground that 
" 'the appeal was not perfected in the manner provided by law in that 
opposing counsel was not given reasonable written notice of the time and 
place of tendering the transcript and a reasonable opportunity to examine 
the original or a true copy of it,'" under Rule 5:1, section 3(f).121 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Virginia judgments and re-
manded the cases for reconsideration in light of ]ones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co./22 decided the same day.l23 
On remand, the Virginia Court was adamant: 
Our orders of December 4, 1967, refusing the appeals in these cases, 
were adjudications that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the 
120E.g., Crum v. Udy, 206 Va. 880, 146 S.E.2d 878 (1966); Mears v. Mears, 206 
V.a. 444, 143 S.E.2d 889 (1965). 
121209 Va. at 280, 163 S.E.2d at 589. See 208 Va. cxili (1967). 
'122 392 u.s. 409 (1968). 
123 392 U.S.657 (1968). 
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appeals because of the failure of counsel for the Sullivans and the 
Freemans to meet the requirements of Rule 5:1, § 3(f). Only this 
court may say when it does and when it does not have jurisdiction 
under its Rules. We had no jurisdiction in the cases when they were 
here before, and we have no jurisdiction now. We adhere to our 
orders refusing the appeals in these cases.124 
To support its procedural ruling, the Court cited ouly Snead v. Common-
'Jl)ealth/25 ignoring countervailing precedent. And of Snead, the Court said 
simply: "In Sne{Cd ... we held the terms of Rule 5:1, § 3(f) to be manda-
tory and jurisdictional, and for the failure of counsel for Snead to meet the 
requirements of the Rule, the writ of error ... was dismissed." 126 
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari. No Justice found that the 
Virginia Court's application of section 3 (f) precluded federal review of the 
Sullivan merits, although failure by a party to abide by state procedural 
requirements constitutes an adequate state ground of decision, which almost 
invariably precludes such federal review. The Court, it appears, was not 
persuaded that the Sullivan parties had actually violated the section as it 
migllt reasonably have been understood when they tendered the transcript. 
In terms of its own prior section 3 (f) decisions, the Virginia Court's 
action in Sullivan was not reasonably foreseeable. Past decisions have been 
concerned with whether opposing counsel had a reasonable opportunity to 
examine the transcript after he received notice of its tender to the judge 
and before its signature by the judge. These decisions have put no stress 
on written, as opposed to actual, no~ce; nor have they indicated that the 
provision of written notice in advance of the act of tendering is quintes-
sential. As the Court stated in Bacigalupo v. Fleming: 
The requirement that opposing counsel have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to examine the transcript sets out the purpose of reasonable 
notice. If, after receipt of notice, opposing counsel be afforded rea-
sonable opportunity to examine the transcript, and to make objections 
thereto, if any he has, before it is signed by the trial judge, the object 
of reasonable notice will have been attained.127 
The Court of Appeals had also made clear in Bolin v. Laderbergl2B that 
the signature of the trial judge, unaccompanied by objections from a party, 
124 209 Va. at 281, 163 S.E.2d at 589. 
12:>200 Va. 850, 108 S.E.2d 399, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 868 (1959). 
126 209 Va. at 280-81, 163 S.E.2d at 589. 
127199 Va. 827, 835, 102 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1958). See also Cook v. Virginia Holsum 
Bakeries, Inc., 207 Va. 815, 153 S.E.2d 209 (1967); Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153 
S.E.2d 251 (1967); Taylor v. Wood, 201 Va. 615, 112 S.E.2d 907 (1960); Stokely v. 
Owens, 189 Va. 248, 52 S.E.2d 164 (1949); Grimes v. Crouch, 175 Va. 126, 7 S.E.2d 
115 (1940); Boyd, supra note 24, at 1811. 
128207 Va. 795,153 S.E.2d 251 (1967). 
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virtually concludes the issue, pursuant to the mandate of Ruk S:J; section 
3(f): 
The motion to dismiss may be overruled surninarily by referring to 
Rule 5: 1 § 3 (f) itself. It is true that the rule requires that counsel 
tendering a transcript "shall give opposing counsel reasonable written 
notice .of the time and J?lace of tendering it and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to examine the original or a true copy of it." But another por-
tion of the rule provides that "the signature of the judge, '\vithou~ 
more, will be deemed to be his certification that counsel had the 
required notice and opportunity, and that the transcript . ; . is au-
thentic." 
Here, the. trial judge noted on the transcript the date it was tendered 
to him and the date he signed it. His signature appears on. the. tran:.. 
script '1!Jithout more and is, ther~fore, his certification that cou.nsel for 
the lesse~ had the required notice . of tendering the tr;tnscript and 
the required opportunity to e?'arnine it.129 • . . . 
Moreover, in Cook v. Virginia Ho?ium Bakeries, Inc., the Justices found 
significant the fact that the party raising the section 3 (f) claim. ~'<;:oncl!c,led 
in oral arg~ent before us that the statement signed by the trial jl:J.dge .was 
correct." 130 In Cook the opposing counsel had been notified on Qctober 1,5 
that tender woul~ take place on October 20; he received a copy , of the 
transcript on Octc:>ber 19; it was signed by the judge two d;tys. later,. C)q. 
the 21st. · · · ' ' · · 
Opposing counsel in Sullivan receive~ actual notice of the. te~deri~g of 
~he tra~cript on June 9, and written notice on June 12. The tr~p..scri~t .. l~Y; 
m the JUdge's chambers from June 9 to· June 19, and was available there 
to opposing counsel at least from the 12th. He had a copy of it m his pos-
session for three. days, from the 16th to the 19th, and he affirinativel)" made 
known his satisfaction with it. He presented no objections to its signature by 
the judge on June 20. During· oral argument before. the' ·Sup;t:eme .Court, 
defendants could not poiq.t to a single inaccuracy in the transcript.131 In 
short, opposing counsel in Sullivan had a reasonable opportunity....:and .all 
the opportunity that he desired-to examine the transcript after he was liOti-
fied of its tender and before its signature by the judge. . · : 1 
Reliance on Snead did not avail the Virginia Court. That. case involved 
outrageous facts: A narrative ,rather than a trans.cript wa.S tendered; appel-
lant's own counsel admitted that it was "confusing;"· tender occurred 
after working hours and with a view to immediate signature; and opposing 
counsel was giv;e~ orny one· half hour's notice. The Court empha:'ized. th~ 
129 Id. at 797, 153 S.E.2d at 253; accord, Boyd, supra note 24, at 1811-12. 
130 207 Va. 815,817, 153 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1967). 
131 396 U.S. at 246-47 n.l3 (Harlan, ]., d~enting). · · 
1970]\' ' Practice and Pleading 1529 
facts heavily in determining that reasonable notice had ,not been given 
"within the plain meaning of Rule 5:1, § 3 (f)," the terms of which are 
«mandatory and jurisdictional." 132 But the facts of Sullivan ·are wholly 
unlike those of Snead, and, absent any explanation by the Court, it is diffi-
cult to see how Snead in any way precluded a finding that the Sullivan 
plaintiffs had complied with section 3(f). Justice Harlan seems clearly cor-
rect in his conclusion that "[t]he finding of the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals of a violation of Rule 5:1, § 3 (f), in this case was ... based on a 
standard of reasonableness much stricter than that which could have been 
fairly extracted from the earlier Virginia cases applying the rule .... " 133 
This is not to say that section 3 (f) is not "mandatory and jurisdictional" 
as the Virginia Court has insisted. Justice Douglas, writing f?r the majority 
in Sullivan, erred in terming the rule "dicretionary," but perhaps his ter-
minology was occasioned by a desire to be gracious. For if the rule is juris-
dictional, then the Virginia Court's refusal to hear the Sullivan appeals 
constituted a sudden shift in judicial interpretation of the demands of the 
rule. Such judicial law-making was certainly within the power of the Court, 
and it could certainly conclude the litigation so far as Virginia rights were 
concerned. But the Court's .decision could not deny federal review of a 
state decision affecting federal rights. Failure by a party to follow a state 
procedural rule provides an adequate state ground of decision, foreclosing 
federal review, only when the party might reasonably have been aware of 
the rule's demands.134 
The Virginia Court's decision in Sullivan was unfortunate on a number 
132 It is important that time be given opposing counsel for a reasonable opportunity 
to analyze such statements characterized by defendant's counsel as being con-
fusing. :The entire testimony of a very material witness was left out of the narra-
tive statement when it was presented to the trial judge and it was necessary for 
him to insert it. We are of the opinion that the notice delivered to the Com-
monwealth's Attorney at his residence, after office hours, thirty minutes before 
tendering a narrative statement of the evidence to the trial judge for his signature, 
·does not constitute reasonable notice within the plain meaning of Ru1e 5:1, § 3(f) 
and that the terms of this Rule are mandatory and jurisdictional. 
200 Va. at 854, 108 S.E.2d at 402. 
133 396 U.S. at 245. 
13~'fhe Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 456 {1958), stated that 
"[w]e are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court 
m the present case with its past unambiguous holdings as to the scope of review avail-
able upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt judgment." The Court went 
on to say that, even if the Alabama ruling had some basis in precedent, "such a local 
procedural rule, although it may now appear in retrospect to form part of a con-
sistent, pa,ttern, of procedures to obtain appellate review, cannot avail the State here, 
because petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been appriSed of its existence. 
Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this 
Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindi-
cation in state courts of their federal constitutional rights." Id. at 457-58. 
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of scores. First, it confused and rigidified a s~ep. ·of the appel!ate· process, 
S~~onQ., the decision amounted to little more th~n a judicial. ipse dixit.iti 
particularly inappropriate circumstances: Sudden chang~.in·th_e interpre.:. 
tation of a rule, especially changes costly to persons who .llitve reasonably 
relied on past interprcitation, shoUld be carefully. explained and justified in 
the opinion announcing the new reading .. F.1nally, the ~ullivan cases pro-;-
vided the Virginia Justices a_n opportunity ~o ,deal .with a matter of great 
complexity and contemporary moment. Had they treated the. merits in ·a 
well-reasoned opinion, they could have ·contributed significantly to the shap• 
ing of the national corpus juris. It. is regrettable that the Court· felt- itself 
jurisdictionally precluded from dealing with the substan~e of: Sullivan. · . 
Amendment of Rule 5:1 
On September 1, 1970, a significant am.ertdme-nt of Virginj:a Supreme 
Court of Appeals Rule 5:1,135 section 6(a) t_ook effect, ·changing the time 
for designation of the parts of the record to be' printed. Priot to i.ts amend-:-
ment, section 6(a) called for designation "[n:] ot less than twenty days before 
the record is transmitted." Designation now ta~es·'place "[n]ot more thari 
fourteen days after the date of the certificate of the de,rk of this Court .. -. 
that an appeal has been awarded." This temporal· shift provides welcome 
relief to appellate counsel by limiting the time-;~ons~ming process of desig: 
nation to those cases in which appeal is actually· granted. Unde,r amende,d 
section 6(a), counsel for the appellee has fourteen days from _the filing of 
the appellant's designation to note "the additional· parts of the record that 
he wishes printed as germane to the assignmen~ of error and of any eros~ 
error made." Counsel for appellant, in turn,, has fourteen days from- i:he 
appellee's designation to indicate "any additional [germane] p~ts of the 
record that he may wish printed." The amended requirements of section 
6 (a) have been incorporated into section 6 (b) as· well, and thus apply to 
criminal as well as civil proceedings. Section 6 has been· fmther altered by 
an amendment of section 6(c), which presents in greater detail and some-
what different format the proper form of designation. · ·. 
Rule 5:1, section 7, governing transmission of the record, was necfSsarlly 
amended in the wake of the section 6 changes .. Section 7 p.revio11sly pro-
vided for the retention of the record, in the office of the ·trial .court clerk 
for twenty days after the appellant's designation· of tlie parts to: be printed. 
Under the section as amended, 
[ t] he clerk shall retain the record for twe'n.ty-one days ~fter the notice 
of appeal and assignments of error have been filed with the clerk , . . 
or, if a~ the time of such filing counsel for the appellant also files with 
135-See 211 Va.l13 (1970). 
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the clerk notice that a transcript or statement will thereafter be filed 
... , the clerk shall retain the record for twenty-one days after. the 
filing of such transcript or statement . . . . 
Thus, as a rule, transmission of the record now occurs before, rather than 
after, designation of the parts to be printed. The amended Rule adds a 
statement that "[t]he clerk's failure to transmit the record as herein provided 
shall not be ground for dismissal of the appeal by this Court." In addition, 
the section eliminates the possibility, present under the old rule, of trans-
mittal "to the clerk of this Court at ... Staunton." Transmittal must now 
take place in Richmond alone; the same geographic restriction has been im-
posed in amended Rule 5:4, governing the place for filing petitions and 
records. 
Rule 5: 1 's section 8, like its section 7, has been modified to take account 
of the change in section 6. Under old section 8, the clerk simply caused the 
record to be printed after an appeal was allowed; now he does so "[a]fter 
an appeal has been allowed and all designations for printing have been made, 
or the time allowed therefor has expired, or counsel have indicated earlier 
in writing that no further designations will be made." 
Standard of Review 
In Bailey v. Pioneer Federal Savings & Loan Association, the Court of 
Appeals reiterated that " [ t] he report of a commissioner in chancery . . . 
is entided to great weight and should not be disturbed unless its conclu-
sions are unsupported by the evidence. The decree of a trial court con-
firming the report is presumed to be correct and will not be reversed unless 
plainly wrong." 136 In Bryant v. Commonwealth Custom Builders, Inc., the 
Court affirmed the holding of the trial court, stating: 
The issues which are dispositive of the case are factual. 
The case was tried without a jury. The evidence was not tran-
scribed. From the narrative statement of the testimony and incidents 
of trial prepared by the trial judge, the exhibits and extracts from the 
depositions of two witnesses, we cannot say that the judgment of the 
lower court is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.137 
And in Beale v. ]ones, the Court noted the effect of a jury verdict on appel-
late review, indicating that "the evidence and all proper inferences from the 
evidence will be stated in the light most favorable to the appellee since she 
was awarded the jury's verdict." 138 
13G 210 Va. 558, 562, 172 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1970); accord, Graves, Practice and Ple,lding, 
1968-1969 Annual Survey of Virgi11ia Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1207, 1216 n59 (1969). 
137 210 Va. 296, 171 S.E.2d 268,269 (1969). 
138 210 Va. 519, 520, 171 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1970). 
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Procedural Federalism 
The Virginia Court of Appeals had occasion during the Survey period to 
reiterate its supremacy over Virginia law. Commenting on a Fourth Cir-
cuit decision construing Virginia insurance law139 that had been nullified 
by a subsequent Virginia holding,140 the Court stated of the federal ruling 
that it "was not binding precedent but was only persuasive authority. It 
represented the opinion of the . . . Fourth Circuit on the validity of the 
'other insurance' provision in a Virginia insurance policy that had been issued 
pursuant to statute. Until such time as this court spoke, the validity of the 
'other insurance' provision was not a matter susceptible of exact knowledge 
or interpretation and could only be the subject of an opinion." 141 
Federal courts deferred to Virginia law on numerous occasions during 
the past year-for example, by upholding Virginia process and ordering full 
faith and credit to a Virginia judgment,142 by refusing to give a federal 
forum to a party who had previously acceded to Virginia jurisdiction by 
filing counterclaims in state court,143 and by denying impleader in federal 
court where there was no substantive right under Virginia law to the relief 
sought.144 On the other hand, when a Virginia decision affected substantive 
federal rights, the Supreme Court in Sullivan refused to have its jurisdiction 
ousted by a Virginia procedural ruling that it found to be without adequate 
basis. 
Federalism confronts an unusually delicate situation when a United States 
district court is requested to enjoin the operation of a state law allegedly 
incompatible with the Federal Constitution. There is potential not only for 
the disruption of state programs and activities in such requests, but also 
for a sharp blow to state hubris. Disruption and insult may in turn breed 
resistance. Accordingly, it is important that federal courts take steps to 
lessen the chance of error in the granting of such injunctions,l45 and, fur-
ther, that action be taken by a trial court of unusual dignity, with expedited 
appeal. To these ends, Congress established the three-judge district court, 
with direct appeal of its decisions to the Supreme Court.146 While the three-
judge procedure serves the interests of federal-state comity, it also carries 
139Travclers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963). 
140Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965). 
141 Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co., 210 Va. 396, 400, 171 S.E.2d 264, 
267 (1969) (paragraphing omitted). 
142 Luther Compton & Sons, Inc. v. Community Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 93 
(N.D. Okla.1969). 
143 Sood v. Advanced Computer Techniques Corp., 308 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Va. 1969). 
144 Brooks v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1969). · 
145 "The crux of the business is procedural protection against an improvident state-wide 
doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy." Phillips v. United States, 312 
u.s. 246,251 (1941). 
146 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (Supp. I, 1966). See also id. § 1253 (Supp. H, 1967). 
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with it the severe disadvantage of heightening the burdens of an already 
overburdened federal judiciary. These burdens-the need to assemble three 
federal judges to sit as one trial court and the automatic, direct appeal to 
the Supreme Court-are particularly vexing when the case involves relatively 
unimportant issues. Thus, federal courts have severely limited the avail-
ability of a three-judge court, reading the pertinent statute "not as a measure 
of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enact-
ment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." 147 
A federal district court in Virginia recently was requested to convene a 
three-judge court to hear a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
against both Virginia Senate Joint Resolution No. 12, entitled "Unionization 
of officers and employees of the Commonwealth," and certain rules and 
regulations of the Newport News police and fire departments restricting the 
political activity and unionization of their members.148 The Senate resolu-
tion, adopted in 1946 with the concurrence of the House, provides that 
"[i] t is contrary to the public policy of Virginia for any State, county, or 
municipal officer or agent to be vested with or possess any authority to 
recognize any union as a representative of any such public officers or em-
ployees, or to negotiate with any such union or its agents with respect to 
any matter relating to them or their employment or service .... " 149 The 
plaintiffs challenged the resolution and the Newport News provisions on 
first and fourteenth amendment grounds, suing the city, certain city officials 
and the local Commonwealth's Attorney. The district court denied plain-
tiff's motion to convene a three-judge court, while granting the motion of the 
Commonwealth's Attorney that the action be dismissed as to Virginia, on the 
grounds that the Newport News regulations were purely local in effect and 
that the Senate resolution "expresses only the opinion of that legislative 
body," since it was not adopted in the form of a statute. Thus, there was "no 
state statute of general and statewide application in issue," 150 and no basis 
for a three-judge court or for suit against the Commonwealth. 
Though the Newport News regulations are clearly of only local effect, a 
decision for the plaintiffs in this action will have. impact on other such regu-
lations throughout the Commonwealth. Moreover, though the Senate reso-
lution was not adopted in statute form, a state policy is certainly at issue. 
Nonetheless, much can be said for the district court's decision. Precedent 
147 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941); accord, Goldstein v. Cox, 396 
U.S. 471, 476 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124 (1965). See generally 
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constittttional Litigation, 32 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 1, 29-55 (1964). 
148 Newport News Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Newport News, 307 F. Supp. 1113 
-(E.D. Va. 1969). 
149 Va. Senate J.R. No. 12 (1946). 
150 307 F. Supp. at 1115. 
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suggests that no technicality is too slight to be seized upon as a means to 
avoid a three-judge court.15l Here, iwo routes of escape presented them-
selves. The Newport News regulations are unescapably local, and among 
the classic three-judge court technicalities is the rule that, even where a 
decision against a state policy would affect the state as a whole, if the issue 
arose with direct impact only on a locality, the three-judge court procedure 
is unavailable.152 And, of course, it could be argued in any event that no 
statewide statute is at stake. As a matter of policy, the wisdom of the 
~ourt's refusal to convene a three-judge court was manifest in the Com-
monwealth's lack of interest in the case. The only compelling reason for 
the existence of the three-judge procedure is to minister to states aroused 
over the prospect that a federal court may enjoin practices highly valued 
by them. Virginia was obviously not so aroused here. Thus, federal-state 
comity did not call for an extraordinary trial court and an extraordinary 
appellate process. 
A Concluding Note on Craftsmanship 
Court should be encouraged to say no more than necesary, if for no other 
reason than to contain our burgeoning case reports. But the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals could safely have said more about several of its 
more difficult procedural decisions of the past year. There is, of course, 
some merit in a selective use of precedent that largely ignores decisions 
opposed to the announced result, just as there is some merit in limiting 
discussion of the policy considerations that shaped the result. An opinion 
that simply delivers the law, unexplained, may facilitate decision-making, 
since the court need not come to grips with the precise reasons for its deci-
sion; absent the need to articulate rationale, there is less necessity and im-
petus to confront and deal with countervailing precedent and policy-or, for 
that matter, with material that supports the desired result. An unexplained 
opinion also helps to ward off criticism, for if the court veils its distinguish-
ing or overruling of contrary precedent and if it rarely reveals its policy 
choices and the reasons for them, the opinion will not lend itself easily to 
attack by those with different views about precedent or policy. Further, 
the failure to articulate rationale may promote unanimity on a collegial 
court,_ as often the brethren can agree on result though not on the reasons 
for it. 
Against these advantages, however, are the notable disadvantages of unex-
plained exposition of the law. First, decision-making in which the decision-
maker is not encouraged to face and resolve all pertinent issues of precedent 
and policy runs the risk of being at best unfocused, and at worst ill-advised. 
151 See note 147 supra. 
152E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1964). 
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Second, results without rationale do less than necessary to explain what the 
law is, and this, in tum, breeds uncertainty and unpredictability about things 
legal. It has been well stated that "[e]ven when a court reaches results 
whose wisdom is open to debate, good craftsmanship and technique can 
·Contribute to predictability and 'certainty.' For if a court demonstrates 
that it has considered all the precedents and fully weighed all the relevant 
policy considerations before reaching its final result, even those who disagree 
can evaluate the basis for the holding and recognize the extent to which the 
judgment announced is maintainable and unlikely to yield to future attack. 
Even more important, a careful student can then more accurately estimate 
the probable future scope of the announced holding or rule and the prob-
able future development of the doctrine in the area.'' 153 Finally, a simple 
statement of a court's conclusion does little to satisfy the party who loses, 
and who may have advanced strong precedent and policy arguments in his 
favor. An important function of any court is to explain to the unsuccessful 
party why he lost so that he and society as a whole can have confidence 
that his legitimate claims have been heard and justice done. 
153 P. MisHKIN & C. MoRRis, ON LAw IN CoURTS 224 (1965). 
